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Canon-fodder: Nietzsche, Jarry, Derrida (The Play of 
Discourse and the Discourse of Play) 
Stephen Barker 
I use the word "discourse" not by any means to call attention to the 
apocryphal distinction between that of the imagination and that of science, but 
to juxtapose them in a word, as do Nietzsche in The Gay Science, Alfred Jarry 
in his concept of "Tataphysics" and Derrida in the grammatology of "dissemin-
ation" particularly as laid out in his Eperons. I want to play briefly across 
these texts, on the idea Hugh Kenner proposes in "The Modernist Canon," that 
"a canon is not a list but a narrative" (373) eschewing, after having created out 
of necessity, its own inversion. Canonicity itself consists of this play of outside 
and inside, of the creation of an outside by which the inside is protected but 
which must always be threatening; and of an outside that must threaten even 
while it depends on its own exclusion and therefore on the canonical counter-
state. Canonicity in discourse involves the play of the aleatory and the static, 
of paradigms of changeless essentiality, as the inclusive must see itself, opposed 
to the very heart of danger, the radical opening at the chance of timeless 
displacement. The point here is that, as exclusive of one another as the 
aleatory and the static seem to be, they are mutually interdependent to a 
degree only to be understood if they are taken as discursive traces. And 
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discourse as I want to use it here is not poetry, prose, catalogue, nor formula, 
but the play that, with the protogrammatology of Nietzsche, is to be seen as 
the texture and textuality of linguistic play. 
This kind of play is always either an invasion by force or a civil rebellion. 
Canonicity creates a sphere of influence, and thereby invites insinuation, since 
its "circle of inclusion" is always vulnerable to the wedge with which it is re-
opened. This susceptibility takes many guises. In a sophisticated and 
intelligent manifestation of the most predictable matrix for a social treatment 
of canonicity, Richard Terdiman, in his Marxian Discourse/Counter-discourse, 
claims that 
the power of the dominant discourse lies in the codes by which it 
regulates understanding of the social world. Counter-discourses 
seek to detect and map such naturalized protocols and to project 
their subversion. At stake in this discursive struggle are the 
paradigms of social representation themselves. (149) 
These paradigms, then, become the function not of the revelation of 
Truth, of a hidden structural presence of essential structuration, but of a 
struggle for power that is by no means merely, as it were, social. But if one 
changes the matrix of questions one asks, one can come up with J. Hillis 
Miller's assertion that inversion or deviation from the canon is impossible to 
avoid, since this deviation's 
violence has been incorporated into the structures intended to keep 
it out. However logical man tries to make the hierarchical system 
of concepts within which he lives, cutting everything neatly, like the 
sharp corners of a die, numbering everything and fitting each thing 
into its proper pigeonhole, like coffins in a Roman columbarium, 
this cutting and fitting reverses itself . . . the cutter is cut. ("Dis-
membering" 43) 
What is "at stake" in this validification of canonicity is "considerable," as 
David Allison points out in his introduction to The New Nietzsche: it is in fact 
"the viability of conventional thought itself, its own prospects of limitation, 
decline, future" (xi). For the canon to function as it desires, it must be seen 
to be grounded in a reality outside of language and discourse, in a space of 
solid, objective singularity; thus it sees itself. Acceptance, therefore, that 
"canon" is a function of discourse is itself a radical re-reading of canonicity that 
gives the extra-canonical a dialectical equivalence, indeed a privileging, and 
that thereby disturbs or destroys the grounding on which the power of the 
canon is based. In this way, despite itself, canonicity is always to be caught "in 
play." The origin of this perception is quite recent: Camus, commenting on 
Nietzsche in a piece entitled "Metaphysical Rebellion," declares that it is in 
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Nietzsche that one first perceives that the law itself frees: "Damocles," says 
Camus, "never danced better than beneath the sword" (63). Collapsed together 
in the Nietzschean formulation and in the current (post-Camus) theoretical 
discourse in which canon is re-opened for treatment, are the themes of 
philosophy, art (the dance and narration), and danger, the threat and energy 
of invasion/insertion/incision as the topoi through which the questions of 
canon formation, deformation, and information can be traced. 
But though the discussion of this prying open of the themes of canonicity 
is a recent phenomenon, its gestation has been long. The discourse of play as 
narrative strategy and as struggle, which along with laughter and the dance are 
the three requisites of Nietzsche's Overman in The Gay Science (that is, play 
as I mean it here) is genealogically rooted in Lucretius' On the Nature of 
Things. Its inception occurs at that carrefour in which Lucretius' text, in its 
eagerness to allay with his "atoms" man's fears for his place in the physical 
universe, slips suddenly out of the discourse of comforting science and 
becomes narrative play: his explanation of the origin of the (atomic) will, 
which glides almost perfunctorily into one of human will, begins in the 
institution of his quasi-scientific language, but must simultaneously leap out of 
that paradigm across a chasm with which he can do nothing, and which occurs 
only as a fold in the text: "For surely not by planning did prime bodies find 
rank and place, nor by intelligence" (1.1021-22). How then? 
Though atoms fall straight downward through the void 
by their own weight, yet at uncertain times 
and at uncertain points, they swerve a b i t -
enough that one may say they changed direction. 
And if they did not swerve, they all would fall 
downward like raindrops through the boundless void; 
no clashes would occur, no blows befall the 
atoms . . . 
(11.217-24) 
Whence rises, I say, that will torn free from fate, 
through which we follow wherever pleasure leads 
and likewise swerve aside at times and places 
not foreordained. 
(11.257-60) 
By this veiled force, man must acknowledge that atoms possess 
besides their weights and impacts, one more cause 
of movement-the one whence comes this Power we own, 
72 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
no internal power 
controls the mind in every move it makes. 
a helpless captive bound by what must be: 
this comes from the tiny swerving of the atoms 
at no fixed place and no fixed point in time. 
(11.285-86, 289-93) 
This emergence of the will, for Lucretius, the precise equivalence of the topos 
of narrative for Nietzsche, is a function of the klinôs, the chanceborn swerve 
or turn of atoms, manifesting as we read it in his account that moment of 
discourse in which his own text of the origin of will and clinamen can be 
inscribed. This is because in Lucretius, as can be clearly seen from the leap 
he too must make, this very moment of rational inclusion is a function of the 
discourse in which it is couched but in which it will not be contained, which 
denies it. The clinamen is, in Lucretius as in Nietzsche, the opening of 
discourse itself. This clinamen is for Nietzsche, for Jarry, for Derrida, and for 
the conception of the play of canonicity, what Jarry calls "la bête imprévue" 
(Faustroll VI, 34; OC 714), the declaration of the anticanonical within the 
canon, couched at its very heart, the unexpected beast of which, out of the 
circle of rational inclusivity, creation is made, over which logic has no control, 
which must insert itself, as it does in Lucretius, as the opening of difference 
and of play. Clinamen exists precisely as the discursive necessity of play in the 
canon, the "explanation" of that which must be acknowledged and neutralized 
but which must also, even while it is privileged, be tamed. 
But once the nature of the canonical dialectic is established, it can be 
seen that the extra-canonical, particularly as evidenced in Nietzsche, will not 
allow the Lucretian transference to take place. With the advent of the 
narrative of clinamen, in chance and displacement, that is as a transference, a 
passage from one space to another, comes the advent of the notion of play in 
a number of guises or disguises. Because of the nature of canonicity, all have 
to do, in a perfectly Lucretian way, with the problematic (even chimaerical) 
transfer of plenitude. One of the most obvious of these elements of play 
occurs at the level of ontology-in-metaphor itself. When Nietzsche posits, in 
"On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," that "between two absolutely 
different spheres, as between subject and object, there is no causality, no 
correctness, and no expression; there is, at most, an aesthetic relation," a 
"suggestive transference" (86), he declares that metaphor, instead of being 
understood by the reader as the discursive manifestation of the veiled 
relationship of appearance to reality, must instead be seen as a suggestive 
transference without transfer, that in the economy of the metaphor no essential 
exchange takes place. The world, and the self, are radically not revealed in the 
process of metaphor, according to Nietzsche. This is "the gay science" itself: 
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the juxtaposition of discourses that defy logical consequence and mock their 
inclusivity. The 1882 edition of Die frohliche Wissenschaft, The Gay Science 
(which is, incidentally, parenthetically subtitled, in Italian, "la gaya scienza" 
precisely so that it will not be mis-named T h e Joyful Wisdom") has as its 
epigraph a quotation from Nietzsche's beloved Emerson, which he has 
translated into German: 
Dem Dichter und Weisen sind aile Dinge befreundet und geweiht, 
aile Erlebnisse nûtzlich, aile Tage heilig, aile Menchen gôttlich. 
[To the poet and sage, all things are friendly and hallowed, all ex-
periences useful, all days holy, all men divine.] 
This suggestion of the kind of play of discourses to come, and indeed Emerson 
serves as a model in this respect, is replaced in the second edition five years 
later (years that saw the production of Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, and 
On the Genealogy of Morals) by an epigraph from Nietzsche himself: 
Ich wohne in meinem eignen Haus; 
Hab Niemandem nie nichts nachgemacht 
Und-lachte noch jeden Meister aus, 
Der nicht sich selber ausgelacht. 
-Ueber meiner Hausthur 
[I live in my own house, 
Have imitated no one nor nothing 
And-laugh at the master 
Who cannot laugh at himself. 
—Over my doorway] 
The message on the lintel, that boundary between the sanctuary of 
inclusion/identification and exclusion, between inner and outer, has metamor-
phosed from the tendentious poetic cheer of Emerson's formulation to the 
insular, separating, and challenging formulation of Nietzsche's defiant, mocking 
laughter. Not to be translated from Nietzsche's poetry above, but very much 
a part of the sense of the epigraph, is the aus ('out') that concludes the 
penultimate line: indeed, the laugher might be seen here as laughing the rigid 
pseudo-Master out of the house. The sense is one of rejection of any false 
mastery. Such a position must not only be rejected but thrust away and, 
appropriately, excluded. 
It is in this atmosphere of laughter, viewed as a vital sign of good 
judgement, that for Nietzsche human consciousness becomes a superfluity in 
an extra-canonical way, not as a mere function of the fullness and serenity of 
exsitence as a design, but as a supplément, meaningless because finding 
(creating) meaning only in its laughter, and therefore able to operate 
independent of the mesmerism Lucretius predicates, that of an automatic 
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inclusion which grounds and neutralizes play. For Nietzsche, this neutraliza-
tion is the pure arrogance of language and must be, as we have seen, laughed 
out by being laughed at. The fable with which Nietzsche's "On Truth and Lies 
in a Nonmoral Sense," written in 1873, begins exhibits just this narrative 
laughter: 
In irgend einem abgelegenen Winkel des in zahllosen 
Sonnensystemen flimmernd ausgegossenen Weltalls gab es einmal 
ein Gestirn, auf dem kluge Thiere das Erkennen erfanden. Es war 
die hochmuthigste und verlogenste Minute der 'Weltgeschichte': 
aber doch nur eine Minute. Nach wenigen Athemzugen der Natur 
erstarrte das Gestirn, und die klugen Thiere mussten sterben.-- (370) 
[Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that 
universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, 
there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That 
was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of "world history," 
but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had taken a few 
breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to 
die.] (79) 
In that final, mock-logical surprise, "the clever beasts had to die," lies the 
laughter of clinamen; Nietzsche's narrative takes up precisely that Lucretian 
structure of concealed power. That is, this narrative of the advent of Nietzsch-
ean self-consciousness and knowing seems to consist of, to be told in, 
conventional metaphor. But here also the metaphoric narrative does not enact 
a transference which would permit it to manifest a clearing-away of its 
problematic message. It consists of veiled, mocked metaphor. Acknowledging 
this, Nietzsche places a kind of membrane or margin, a doorway, between it 
and the essay, an interpretive membrane: "the clever beasts had to die"~ 
dash-
-One might invent such a fable, and yet he still would not have 
adequately illustrated how miserable, how shadowy and transient, 
how aimless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature. 
(79) 
The explanation, like the narrative, has expressed its own lack; pursuit of 
any truth, Nietzsche goes on to tell us, must end in impasse, in displacement, 
since the drive for "Truth" is, as he claims a few pages later in the essay, "the 
duty to he according to a fixed convention, to lie with the herd and in a 
manner binding upon everyone" (84). Thus, mocked by its sexual connotations 
("to he with the herd"), the supplementarity of consciousness, taken up at 
length in The Gay Science, notably in the fragment marked "On the 'genius of 
the species™ (V.354) shows itself as a reflection of the truncated metaphorical 
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or aesthetic process we have just read and participated in, a tendentious 
process that produces no transfer, and one that continues to deny its own 
teleology. Nietzsche plays here as well with the polarity of lugen/liegen: to 
he with the herd is to engage in its false assumptions, to participate in the 
group deception that enables the herd to identify itself. 
In Nietzsche's commentary on the herd-lie, consciousness is ontologically 
re-laid out as a displaced reflection of the invention of signs convenient for 
herd communication, signs seen within that alternative or shadow of signs: 
conventional metaphor has laughed itself out. In the narrative, the clever and 
arrogant beast on his planet invents "knowing," an impossible genesis for 
which, according to Nietzsche, "we simply lack any organ." Ontology reveals 
itself, now, in aphorism (read aporism) that J. Hillis Miller calls "disarticul-
ation": the ontic system of forces "inhabiting a single body may produce in its 
interactions the illusion not just of one selfhood, but of many": "Each man is 
the locus of a set of warring interpretations" ("Disarticulation" 259). This play 
of metaphor, as Allen Thiher corroborates, "offers the possibility of wrestling 
rules of the game from the welter of competing discourses, truncated 
languages, and totalitarian codes" (157) of which the "little world" is made. 
Thiher here suggests that in this play "the fall can be overcome." Nietzsche's 
world is measured out by what David Allison calls "alogia" a world of 
"proximate surfaces, of cathected intensities and forces" ("Nietzsche Knows No 
Noumenon" 308). As The Gay Science progresses, mocking progression, in just 
the same way, from its initial "Jokes, Cunning, and Revenge" through the play 
of aphorism to its concluding Songs, we see its strategy of unveiling the veils 
of canonicity. 
This Nietzschean theme is taken up by Alfred Jarry in his fascination with 
the mechanisms of the aleatory relative to what might pass for intelligence, and 
by the way they operate across the notion of system. Jarry, like Nietzsche, has 
written over his doorway, with the same idea in mind: to discover the masters 
who cannot laugh at themselves. In the "Linteau" (lintel) to "Les minutes de 
sable mémorial" Jarry claims that one must read, indeed devour, the philo-
sophers because one will then learn 
1° l'absurdité de répéter leurs doctrines, qui, récentes, traînent aux 
cafés et brasseries, plus vieilles, aux cahiers des potaches; 
2° et surtout, la double absurdité de citer Pétai du nom d'un 
philosophe, quand chacune de ses idées, prise hors de l'ensemble du 
système, bave des lèvres d'un gâteux. 
[1st, the absurdity of repeating their doctrines, that recently has been 
dragged out of cafes and bars, more recently, out of the notebooks 
of schoolboys; 
2nd and above all, the double absurdity of citing the prop of the 
philosopher's name, when each of his ideas, removed from the 
system, dribbles from the lips of a feeble dotard.] (OC 171) 
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The sense of enervation Jarry ascribes to the philosophers results from their 
dogmatic refusal to heed Lucretius' clinamen, Jarry's principle of creativity. 
This etiolation reaches its absurd climax in Père Ubu's famous de-braining 
machine, the device with which, in the Ubu plays, Père Ubu's administrators, 
the Palotins, the most horrifyingly comical instruments of canonicity in 
literature, objectively but with great relish de-brain all seditious elements in the 
community-anyone, that is, who is not one of them. Jarry was castigated, 
when the play was first produced in 1896, for (among many other things) 
giving this machine a status in the production equal to any of the players: it 
is listed, in Ubu Roi, in the cast of characters. Initially seeming the simple 
metaphor for canonicity, the debraining machine-to which all of Ubu's 
enemies are subjected to make them examples of good Christian citizenry-
only works on Sunday, like the priest de-braining the congregation. But we 
rapidly see that the machine operates arbitrarily-, that the Palotins themselves 
are not exempt from it, and that the metaphor is not as simple as we had 
supposed; Jarres is a world of Taltérité ontologique," as Linda Stillman shows 
(Théâtralité 5), in which a "semioclastic prose" asks the Nietzschean question 
"Who are you, Man?" and then instantly answers "I am both God and 
Machine" (Hassan 50). This claim itself is a manifestation of play, of 
clinamen. The de-braining machine becomes the inverted metaphor of 
creative/imaginative writing. Jarry's texts, and not just the Ubu cycle but even 
more importantly Jarry's so-called novels such as Gestes et opinions du docteur 
Faustrolly pataphysicien, are written in what Stillman calls "the interstices of a 
subverted doxa": 
At the same time titillating and insulting the doxa, Jarry's novels are 
traps, tempting to disengage but dangerously grating nonetheless, 
like the gaping and biting jaws that predominate in the novelist's 
metaphors. ("Narrative Techniques" 73) 
Jarry's text is a self-devouring metaphoric machine, created out of a pervasive 
theatricalization within the reserve of what Michel Arrivé calls "un immense 
réseau de jeux de mots" ["an immense network of puns"] ("Langage et 
Métaphysique" 11), the anti-system of which, equivalent to Nietzsche's gay 
science, is 'Pataphysics. 
Tataphysics, preceded by its apostrophe (which would be silent even in 
the Greek but which Jarry insists upon in order "à prévenir le jeu de mots 
simple," to prevent the simple pun-or play—on "patte à physique," physical 
paws), 'pataphysics is, of course, a "jeu de mots" on metaphysics, on para-
physics (always remembering that "physique" is physics and physical), but it is 
also, by a process of dissemination Jarry starts but does not complete and 
which cannot be completed, '/?ate/physics," or the properties and nature of 
authority, "pataleophysics" the study of the nature of the noisy, and 
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"patassophyùcs" the science of vanquishing, killing, or beating Nature. These 
are my improvisations on the "root" of 'pataphysics, but apocryphal as it is and 
they are, they indicate the kind of play in which Jarry operates: the play of 
clinamen, a swerving aside from meaning to the creation of new self-
justificatory meaning on which the edifice of logic can rest. The prefix 'pata,' 
it seems, comes from the colloquial Greek patati-patata, a meaningless patter 
of words. Using it in the way he does, Jarry, like Nietzsche (and other early 
Postmoderns like Lautréamont), radically displaces the notion of science while 
still using, admiring, and desiring its "click" of closure. 'Pataphysics, referred 
to throughout Jarres works but finally defined in Faustroll as, paradoxically, 
"the laws governing exceptions," brings the arbitrary element of chance back 
into play: it is, as Hassan declares with appropriate irony, "the science of 
Nonsense," "a parodie myth" (51). Like Nietzsche's gay science, 'pataphysics 
is not only not a final position; 'pataphysics presents a "system of deviation," a 
clinamen, "suggérer au heu de dire, faire dans la route des phrases un 
carrefour de tous les mots" ["to suggest in place of stating, to make, in the road 
of the phrase, a crossroads of all words"] (OC 171). Michel Arrivé, in his 
commentary in the Collected Works, cautions that 
il faut entendre cette métaphore au pied de la lettre: chaque mot 
d'un texte littéraire ouvre une voie perpendiculaire à la ligne de 
manifestation du discours. 
[it is necessary to understand this metaphor literally: each word of 
a literary text opens out a way perpendicular to the overt line of the 
discourse.] (OC 1098) 
The opening out of a voice is equivalent to the opening out of a way; indeed 
being heard and understood (as does, we remember, Nietzsche's herd) in a 
certain manner is "la ligne de manifestation du discours." This perpendicularity 
of meaning or sense is the force of the figurative clinamen, turning discourse 
aside and re-opening it. 'Pataphysics is not a system beyond systems, but 
always a "shadow" of system, a force acting upon a system. One must think 
here of the equivalent in Faustroll of Zarathustra's shadow, the double 
interpreters of the text from within. The first is Faustroll's babboon, Bosse de 
Nage, whose blue buttocks have been surgically transferred to his face. He is 
indeed "la bête imprévue," Nietzschean laughter personified; indeed, as if to 
clarify this, his only words are "ha ha." 
The other shadow interpreter of Faustroll is the narrator of the story, the 
bailiff Panmuphle, from whose point of view the story unfolds but who tells his 
story in order to reach Faustroll's own writing, his elaborate text, which 
Panmuphle is reading throughout. Although at first another of those avatars 
of the canon itself (he is a bailiff), Panmuphle reveals himself as just the sort 
of commentator on Faustroll's story that Jarry is on the culture around him. 
The reading of Faustroll's manuscript by Panmuphle takes place in the most 
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elaborate of metaphoric questionings, and lays the foundation of the 'pataphys-
ical inquiry in which the reader is participating. In the chapter immediately 
preceding his bald definition of 'pataphysics, and which sets up the need for 
such a definition, a chapter with the Nietzschean title "Concerning the Chosen 
Few," Jarry concludes 
Cependant, René-Isidore Panmuphle, huissier, commençait de lire 
le manuscrit de Faustroll dans une obscurité profonde, évoquant 
l'encre inapparente de sulfate de quinine aux invisibles rayons 
infrarouges d'un spectre enfermé quant à ses autres couleurs dans 
une boîte opaque. 
[Meanwhile, René-Isidore Panmuphle, bailiff, began to read 
Faustroll's manuscript in a deep darkness, evoking the unseen 
quinine sulfate ink of invisible infrared rays in a spectrum shut off 
from its other colors in an opaque well.] (OC 667) 
Thus the universal interpreter and devourer (Panmuphle = "pan-mufle = "All-
muzzle or mouth"; it is also argot for "a low trick") receives the text we are 
reading just as we do, through his own problematic powers of interpretation, 
always subject to and engaged in revision and reopening. 
Panmuphle's (and our) trajectory through the text is mockingly analogized 
by the journey of Faustroll himself: as he sets off from Paris (on a circular 
journey back to Paris) aboard his text/sieve, the boat made up of a "loose 
weave" through which water will not pass, he engages in the "transcoding" 
Joseph Riddel, after Derrida, calls "paleonymics," the re-institution of the 
nomenclature, here of mathematics but of any discipline, in new circumstances 
and for subversive or suspicious reasons. Even when quoted by Panmulphe, 
the words of the old discourse take on a perpendicular signification through 
'pataphysics' radical ambiguity. This comes about through the reification of 
the 'pataphysical world as supplementary, like the world of "the gay science." 
Jarr/s images for this reification are suitably solipsistic: Faustroll's Chapter 
34, "Clinamen," begins: 
. . . Cependant, après qu'il n'y eut plus personne au monde, la 
Machine à Peindre, animée à l'intérieur d'un système de ressorts 
sans masse, tournait en azimut dans le hall de fer du Palais des 
Machines, seul monument debout de Paris désert et ras, et comme 
une toupie, se heurtant aux piliers, elle s'inclina et déclina en 
directions indéfiniment variées, soufflant à son gré sur la toile des 
murailles la succession des couleurs fondamentales étagées selon 
les tubes de son ventre, comme dans un bar xm pousse-l'amour, les 
plus claires, plus proches de l'issue. Dans le palais scellé hérissant 
seul la polissure morte, moderne déluge de la Seine universelle, la 
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bête imprévue Clinamen éjacula aux parois de son univers: (OC 
714) 
[ . . . Meanwhile, after no one was left in the world, the Painting 
Machine, animated from within by a system of weightless springs, 
revolved in azimuth in the iron hall of the Palace of Machines, the 
only monument standing in a deserted and razed Paris, and like a 
top, toppling against the pillars, it tipped and swerved in infinitely 
varied directions, spewing at whim onto the canvas-covered walls the 
succession of primary colors arrayed in the tubes of its stomach, like 
a pousse-Vamour in a bar, the lightest ones nearest the opening. In 
the sealed palace, alone breaking the dead glassiness, modern deluge 
of the universal Seine, the unforeseen beast Clinamen ejaculated 
onto the walls of its universe:] 
(And there follows a series of short "sub-chapters," the ejaculations of the 
machine of imagination, whose thirteen sections track the mocking of a 
Christian apotheosis.) The organized and mechanistic chaos of the artful 
machine, whose technique is very much like that which Jackson Pollack claims 
to adopt for his work, throwing paint from random cans from the top of a 
stepladder, or like the "foundness" of "found" poetry, seemingly composed 
without premeditation, co-mingles here with the highly-ordered mechanical 
operation of chance to present precisely the carrefour, the crossroads, the 
perpendicularity of 'pataphysics. That is, the aleatory in art, the moment or 
inception of creation, is always protected as being previous to or outside the 
"process" of mechanical representation which art so often manifests, as indeed 
does Jarr /s book, but that very aleatory nature is only manifest when 
mechanical reproduction gives it form and substance. Thus, the mechanical is 
inherently implicated, along with the aleatory, in the nature of art. The 
painting machine here, then, symbolizes that merging of the original effusion 
and the working out of that energy that forms another permutation of the 
inner and the outer, though for Jarry the inner is seen as being excluded from 
the exterior, public sphere. 
It is in light of art as "ejaculation" onto the walls of death that one can 
clearly see the opening of dissémination, the Derridean rift. The effort of 
Derrida's deconstruction is, as Edward Said claims, "to reveal the entame--
the tear, or perhaps the incision-in every one of the solid structures put up by 
philosophy-an entame already inscribed in written language itself' (696). 
Derrida's is the pure play of the canon, in which "jouer" slips into "jouir" into 
"jouissance"---cAdy as joy as ejaculation, for the Painting Machine, as we have 
seen in Jarry, (more gemraHy~attention aux femmes!) an orgasm of poetry. 
To see dissémination as the "hermeneutic of the death of God" (Taylor 6) is 
to make Derrida's "il n'y a pas de hors-texte!" an echo of Jarres explosive, 
jarring "Merdre!," the radical first word of Ubu Roi, itself commenting on the 
nature of language as a manifestation of acceptability: merdre can be said, as 
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merde cannot, and so merdre stands as a kind of monument erroneous and 
canonically active. Derrida and Jarry here reflect Nietzsche's "Gott ist tot!," at 
once denying the very definition of God and, by its formulation, formed by the 
supplement of copula, reflecting across its space the transference that denies 
death. 
Words may now, in these spotlights of Nietzsche, Jarry, and Derrida, be 
read relational^ and provisionally, but never representationally. They may 
not stand for something concealed or hidden or essential, and they must be 
told that they are always trying to do so. Derrida's approach is an unsettling, 
a suspicion, a corrosion. Derrida works through non-concepts like dissémina-
tion as non-parts of a 'pata-canon, as those who want to make Derrida "de ris 
Dieu," out of God's laughter, would say, always already marginal. Derrida's 
is a "technique of trouble" (Said 683). 
In Éperons, or Spurs, his analysis of Nietzsche's styles, and particularly 
the style of Die frôhliche Wissenschafft, Derrida shows style to be, as it is for 
Nietzsche and Jarry, a sharp intrusion, made with pen or stylo, but possibly 
with "stylet" (stiletto) or even rapier (36); for Derrida, the clinamen's swerving 
depends upon, veers from, plays with, and stabs at the notion of Truth. Style 
must be seen as rebellion against the letter, a manifestation of inclusion and 
the declaration of exclusion, always a distancing, a déplacement, a veiled 
protection in the midst of attack. At the level of the power of writing to 
protect by veiling, Derrida sees the inception of the canon's insidious incursion. 
And it is at this point that the deconstructive writer becomes the chair à canon, 
the "flesh of the cannon" or, cannon-fodder, with all of its overtones of 
sexuality and violence. In his treatment of woman as style in The Gay 
Science's Book II, Derrida depends heavily upon Section 60, "Women and their 
action at a distance," then allowing "distance" to slip to the German, "Distanz," 
then to the Heideggerian "Dis-tanz," then to the seductive play of "dies tanz," 
this dance. His claim is that language forces the writer and the reader to 
accommodate this slippage, since as Richard Rorty points out, "crosstalk is all 
that we are going to get; . . . no gimmick like 'the new science of grammatol-
og / is going to end or aufheben it" (159). Derrida's is a world of discourse in 
endless play, "le jeu du monde." Part of this play, for Derrida, is that canonical 
inversion is already there—it cannot be kept out, since there is, finally, no in 
and out but only co-generative forces of inclusion and exclusion acting 
simultaneously on and within any and every text. J. Hillis Miller points out 
that "these fearful forces" are already in "the sage's hut, the scientist's tower, 
and the artist's fabrications" ("Dismembering" 43). For Derrida, as for 
Nietzsche, that impossible spur to inclusion-in-exclusion is metaphor itself, and 
finds its symbol in the metaphor of woman, that which writing can never 
become. Derrida concludes Éperons with the conjecture that 
c'est peut-être ce que Nietzsche nommait 
le style, le simulacre, la femme. 
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Mais il devient assez manifeste, d'un gai 
savoir, que pour cette raison même il n'y a 
jamais eu le style, le simulacre, la femme. 
Ni la différence sexuelle. 
Pour que le simulacre advienne, il faut 
écrire dans l'écart entre plusiers styles. 
S'il y a du style, voilà ce que nous insinue 
la femme (de) Nietzsche, il doit y en avoir 
plus d'un. 
Deux éperons au moins, telle est l'échéance. 
Entre eux l'abyme où lancer, risquer, perdre 
peut-être l'ancre. 
[Perhaps this is what Nietzsche named 
style, simulacrum, woman. 
But it becomes sufficiently manifested, in a gay 
science, that for this reason alone there has never 
been the style, the simulacrum, the woman. 
Nor the sexual difference. 
For the simulacrum to occur, it must 
be written in the gap between several styles. 
If there is style, that is where we insinuate 
the woman (of) Nietzsche, there must be 
more than one. 
Two spurs at least, that is the obligation. 
Between them the abyss where one throws, risks, loses, 
maybe, the anchor.] (138) 
It is in this respect that "play" takes on the secondary, disséminai weight of 
"spielen," to gamble, to play the game with the possibility of slipping through 
it, of becoming lost. The "obligation" of which Derrida speaks, for the writer, 
is the realization that a grammatology need not exist for the performance of 
the questioning of the canon, that the very notion of meaning can only result 
in a decentering of meaning that must always result in deviation: déplacement 
is never having arrived. Meaning is always a function of change, of its own 
participial formulation; it is nothing but the swerve it names. This is the 
source of Derrida's danger (to the canon and the canonical community) 
beyond that of Nietzsche's final joy or Jarry's hilarity: Derrida takes the 
notion of meaning, clinamen, "au pied de la lettre." Denotation must always, 
for Derrida, be traced to designation, the opening and constant re-opening of 
the sign, and to Nietzsche's favorite bezeichnen, to mark or call, and its 
subsequent die Bezeichnung, the mark, sign, or symbol, and to his much-used 
verschieben, to shift or postpone, which leads us directly back, by that 
Nietzschean genealogy in which Derrida writes, to the shift and postponement 
of différance. Derrida's exercise of clinamen, in Éperons, the turning of the 
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discursive symbol on discourse itself, traces as its pattern Jarres favorite 
"symbol," the spiral or vortex. Thus Derrida draws with him, in the way in 
which the writer re-invents his predecessors, all the metaphors of Nietzsche 
and Jarry, along with the density of text, into the abyss with the anchor that he 
has thrown, risked, and lost. 
The canon as an edifice of exclusion simply cannot withstand such 
insinuation. On the other hand, the forces acting upon it, from Nietzsche, 
from Jarry, from Derrida, are themselves confessedly in a dialectical engage-
ment with that very structuration. They must live with each other in the most 
uneasy of tensions and in an acknowledgement of mutual need. When 
Nietzsche discusses in the opening section of Jenseits von Gut und Bôse the 
fact that "the fundamental faith of the metaphysician is the faith in opposite 
values" (1.2) and "de omnibus dubitandum" all is to be doubted, here a 
quotation of, most interestingly, Descartes, he sets up not only the nature of 
doubt and of questioning, per se> but a radically new ground, within the canon, 
for his great question, "have I been understood?" Only across those mem-
branes and through those doorways of canonicity can this question be-not 
answered, but posed, infinitely. Nietzsche provides the germ, Jarry and 
Derrida some of the produce that becomes the fourrage, and the chair, on 
which the canon feeds. 
University of California, Irvine 
À Note on Translation in the Text 
I have relied on the standard translations of Jarry, Nietzsche, and others here, when such 
translations exist. These are listed in the "Works Cited" pages. I have slightly altered some 
translations, without so indicating, where I felt the translation diverged too far from the original. 
Where no translation for the material in question exists, as in the case with many passages of 
Jarry, the translations are my own. 
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